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O'Brien: Constitutional Law
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

SOUTH CAROLINA: LAST HAVEN FOR RAPE
VICTIM PRIVACY?
1.

INTRODUCTION
South Carolina is one of only three states that criminalizes publishing

the identity of sexual assault victims.' The United States Supreme Court struck
down the statutes of the other two states, Georgia and Florida, as violative of
the First Amendment2 rights of the press However, as recently as 1990, the
South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of South Carolina's
version of this type of statute.4
5 the South Carolina Supreme
Recently, inDoe v. Berkeley Publishers,
Court once again heard arguments in a suit brought for a violation of the state's
rape shield statute. Berkeley Publishersis factually distinctive from previous
cases because the sexual assault victim who brought the suit was a man. The
plaintiff, while in a county jail, was sexually assaulted by another inmate.7 A
report of this assault in a local newspaper, The Berkeley Independent,included
the victim's name.' The victim sued the newspaper for invasion of privacy and

1. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-730 (Law. Co-op. 1976). For the other two states, see
infra note 3 and accompanying text. See generallyCarol Schultz Vento, Annotation, Propriety
ofPublishingIdentity of Sexual Assault Victim, 40 A.L.R. 5th 787 (1996) (analyzing criminal
and civil cases resulting from publication of sexual assault victims' identities).
2. First Amendment protections of speech and press are applicable to the individual
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. This Comment will
refer to these rights only as First Amendment rights.
3. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,496-97 (1975) (invalidating Georgia's
statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-23 (1992)); see infra Part II.A. The Georgia state legislature has
since amended the statute to conform to the holding in Cox Broadcasting.
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (ruling Florida's statute, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 794.03 (West 1987) (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03 (West Supp. 1999),
unconstitutional)); see infra Part ll.A. After amendment by the legislature, the Florida Supreme
Court struck down the statute in Floridav. Globe Communications,Corp., 648 So. 2d 110, 114
(Fla. 1994). See infra Part II.B.
A fourth state, Wisconsin, repealed a similar statute following the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Cox Broadcasting.See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 942.02 (West 1973)
(repealed 1976).
4. See Dorman v. Aiken Communications, Inc., 303 S.C. 63,66,398 S.E.2d 687,689
(1990) (per curiam) (declining "to hold the statute unconstitutional on its face").
5. 329 S.C. 412, 496 S.E.2d 636, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 406 (1998).
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-730.
7. Berkeley Publishers,329 S.C. at 413, 496 S.E.2d at 636.
8. Doe v. Berkeley Publishers, 322 S.C. 307,309-10,471 S.E.2d 731,732 (Ct. App.
1996), rev'd, 329 S.C. 412,496 S.E.2d 636, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 406 (1998).
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intentional infliction of emotional distress. The newspaper's publisher,
Berkeley Publishers, asserted First Amendment privilege in its answer.9
The trial court granted a directed verdict to the newspaper. ° On
appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals successfully avoided addressing
any constitutional issues surrounding the statute by ruling that the rape shield
statute was not applicable to the facts of the case." Rather, the court held that
the South Carolina Freedom of Information Act 2 governed the case because
the victim's name was included on a sheriff's department's incident report. 3
Under the Freedom of Information Act, any information on an incident report,
including a victim's name, is public information and available for publication. 4
Nonetheless, the court of appeals remanded the case for a factual determination
on the plaintiff's cause of action for invasion of privacy.' The supreme court
reversed, holding as a matter of law that no invasion of privacy occurred.' 6
Although rape shield statutes have existed for many decades, 7 courts

9. In an effort to retain some privacy, the victim filed the summons and complaint as
John Doe. The trial judge ordered the victim to use his real name. On appeal, the South Carolina
Supreme Court granted his motion to use the fictitious name "John Doe." Id. at 310,471 S.E.2d
at 732.
10. Id. at 309, 471 S.E.2d at 732.
11. Id. at311, 471 S.E.2d at 733.
12. S.C. CODE-ANN. §§ 30-4-10 to -110 (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1998).
13. Berkeley Publishers,322 S.C. at 311, 471 S.E.2d at 733.
14. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-50(A)(8) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998) (declaring
"incidentreports which disclose the nature, substance, and location of any crime or alleged crime
reported as having been committed" to be public information).
15. See Berkeley Publishers,322 S.C. at 314,471 S.E.2d at 735 (remanding for ajury
determination of whether publishing the victim's name in the particular circumstance was a
"matter of public significance").
16. Doe v. Berkeley Publishers, 329 S.C. 412,414,496 S.E.2d 636,637, cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 406 (1998).
17. South Carolina's rape shield statute existed before 1912. The 1912 version of the
statute reads:
Whoever publishes, or causes to be published, the
name of any woman, maid or woman-child, upon
whom the crime of rape or an assault with intent to
ravish has been committed or alleged to have been
committed, in this State, in any newspaper, magazine,
or other publication, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than one thousand
dollars, or imprisonment ofnot more than three years:
Provided, the provisions of this Section shall not
apply to publications made by order of Court.
2 S.C. CODE § 317 (1912) (emphasis added). Note that this version recognized only female
victims. Gender was not an issue inBerkeleyPublishersbecause the current version contains no
reference to the victim's gender:
Whoever publishes or causes to be published the
name ofanyperson upon whom the crime of criminal
sexual conduct has been committed or alleged to have
been committed in this State in any newspaper,
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only recently have entertained constitutional challenges. With few exceptions,
courts have consistently failed to rule directly on the constitutionality of these
statutes, opting instead to limit their holdings narrowly or to avoid the question
entirely. However, Berkeley Publishersonce again brings focus to "the conflict
between truthful reporting and state-protected privacy interests" inherent in
rape shield statutes.' 8
This Comment examines the constitutional issues surrounding statutes
that prohibit publishing the identity of sexual assault victims. Part II examines
case law involving the constitutionality of rape shield statutes. Part HI presents
policy arguments for and against such statutes. Finally, Part IV examines South
Carolina's rape shield statute under the constitutional standard established by
case law and recommends revisions that would allow it to survive
constitutional challenge.
II.

CASE LAW
A.

United States Supreme Court

The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of rape shield
statutes in Cox BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn.19 In Cox Broadcastingthe father
of a rape and murder victim brought a civil suit for invasion of privacy against
a television station that revealed the identity of his daughter in violation of
Georgia's rape shield statute.2 ° The defendant, a local broadcasting company,
obtained the identity of the victim from publicjudicial records.2' The trial court
held that violation of the statute entitled injured parties to a civil remedy and
therefore found the television station liable.' On appeal the Georgia Supreme
Court found the statute constitutionally valid.' The United States Supreme
Court reversed this decision in an explicitly narrow and extremely cautious
opinion. The Court limited its decision with the following statement: "Rather
than address the broader question whether truthful publications may ever be
subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently with the First and Fourteenth

magazine or other publication shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall
be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand
dollars or imprisonment ofnot more than three years.
The provisions of this section shall not apply to
publications made by order of court.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-730 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (emphasis added).
18. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989).

19. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
20. Id. at 474; see supra note 3.
21. Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 472-73.

22. Id. at474.
23. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 200 S.E.2d 127,134 (Ga. 1973) (stating that Georgia's
rape shield statute is "a legitimate limitation on the right of freedom of expression contained in
the First Amendment"), rev'd, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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Amendments,... it is appropriate to focus on the narrower interface between
The Court held that a state may
press and privacy that this case presents . ,."24
not impose sanctions against the press for truthfully reporting information
obtained from the court records of a public prosecution.s
Shortly after Cox Broadcasting,the Supreme Court in Smith v. Daily
Mail Publishing Co.26 again ruled against privacy rights and struck down a
West Virginia statute that prohibited publishing the names ofjuvenile criminal
suspects.27 In Daily Mail a local newspaper obtained the name of a fourteenyear-old murder suspect from eye-witness interviews and, after three local
radio stations broadcasted it, published the suspect's name.28 On appeal, the
Supreme Court struck down the statute as unconstitutionalbecause it prohibited
only newspaper publication while imposing no similar restrictions on other
forms of the press such as electronic media.29 In its opinion, the Court extended
its holding in Cox Broadcasting by precluding punishing the press for
publishing any truthful information lawfully obtained: "[I]f a newspaper
lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then
state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information,
absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order."3 As with Cox
Broadcasting,the Court emphasized the narrow scope of its holding.3 '
The Supreme Court most recently ruled on the constitutionality of rape
shield statutes specifically in FloridaStarv. B.J.F.32 The Court, by a narrow
majority, reversed a Florida court's affirmance of $100,000 in compensatory
and punitive damages to a rape victim whose name a newspaper inadvertently
published. 33 The newspaper published the victim's name after an inexperienced
reporter copied a police crime report which included the victim's name.34 This
publication violated the newspaper's internal policy. 35 The victim sued the
newspaper, under a per se negligence theory, for invasion of privacy.36 In a
very instructive opinion finding Florida's statute violative of the First
Amendment, the Court first noted that the reporter obtained the victim's name
from the police department, an integral part of the same government which
sought to punish the subsequent publication. The Court stated: "Where, as

24. Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at491.
25. Id.

26. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
27. Id. at 104.

28. Id. at 99-100.
29. Id. at 104-05.
30. Id. at 103. The interest advanced by the State was the alleged improved
rehabilitation ofjuvenile offenders as a result of maintaining their anonymity. The Court found
this interest was "not sufficient to justify application of a criminal penalty." Id. at 104.
31. Id. at 105 ("Our holding in this case is narrow.").
32. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
33. Id. at 529.
34. Id. at 527.
35. Id. at 528.
36. Id.
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here, the government has failed to police itself in disseminating information,
it is clear under Cox Broadcasting... that the imposition of damages against
the press for its subsequent publication can hardly be said to be a narrowly
tailored means of safeguarding anonymity. 37 Punishing the press for
publishing a government news release, the Court reasoned, would likely result
in self-censorship of the press.38
Second, and perhaps most importantly, the Court noted that imposition
of a negligence per se standard allows no case-by-case analysis of the facts, but
simply imposes "liability... automatically from publication."39' Publication of
any kind violates the statute,
regardless of whether the identity of the
victim is already known throughout the
community; whether the victim has
voluntarily called public attention to the
offense; or whether the identity of the
victim has otherwise become a reasonable
subject of public concern-because,
perhaps, questions have arisen whether the
victim fabricated an assault by a particular
person.'
The Court believed that limiting truthful publication requires a case-by-case
analysis so that any decision would not reach too broadly. The Court's opinion
reflected this belief by limiting its holding explicitly to the facts of the case.41
Finally, the Court stated that the statute was facially underinclusive by42
prohibiting publication only by an "'instrument of mass communication.")
Disclosures by individuals to the victim's co-workers or friends are not
penalized although such disclosures "may have consequences as devastating
as the exposure of [the victim's] name to large numbers of strangers. 43
Despite the Court's ruling, it did not preclude the possibility of a
constitutional rape shield statute: "We do not hold.., that a State may never
punish publication of the name of a victim of a sexual offense." 44 In addition,
the Court did "not rule out the possibility that, in a proper case, imposing civil
sanctions for publication of the name of a rape victim might

Id. at 538.
Id.
Id. at 539.
Id.
Id. at 541.
42. Id. at 540 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03 (West 1987) (current version at FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 794.03 (West Supp. 1999)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 541.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
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be... overwhelmingly necessary to advance" the interests of the state. 5 The
Court instead very narrowly held that punishing the truthful publication of
lawfully obtained, publicly significant information must support a significant
state interest. ' It determined that the state interests advanced, namely
encouraging victims of sexual assault to report the crime as well as ensuring the
privacy and safety of those victims, were "highly significant" but, "under the
circumstances of this case," did not warrant the imposition of liability."
B.

Other Cases

Rape privacy statutes first faced constitutional challenge over fifty
years ago in State v. Evjue." In Evjue Wisconsin brought criminal charges
against a newspaper for violating a Wisconsin statute that prohibited publishing
the identity of female rape victims. 9 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed
a lower court ruling and upheld the constitutionality of the statute." After
balancing the state interests advanced by the statute, namely protecting the
privacy of sexual assault victims and improving prosecution of offenders, with
the "minimum of social value in the publication," the court concluded that the
"slight restriction of the freedom of the press" was justified.5 '
The first civil action brought under South Carolina's rape shield statute
occurred over thirty-five years ago in Nappier v. Jefferson StandardLife
Insurance Co. 5 2 InNappierthe identities of two sexual assault victims and their
vehicle were well known throughout the state.53 In reporting on the sexual
assault of the two women, a television station broadcasted a picture of their
vehicle, effectively identifying the victims.i4 The victims sued the television
station for invasion of privacy, basing their claim on both common law

45. Id. at 537.
46. Id. at 541.
47. Id. at 537.
48. 33 N.W.2d 305 (Wis. 1948).
49. Id. at 306.
50. Id. at 312.
51. Id.
52. 322 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1963).
53. The court stated:
These young women were employed by the Dental
Division of the South Carolina Department of Health
to teach dental hygiene in the public schools. In this
work they adopted a puppet play, the puppet
commonly known as "Little Jack." Throughout the
State they were therefore spoken of as "The Little
Jack Girls." A station wagon was furnished them by
the State on each side of which was prominently
lettered "Little Jack, Dental Division, South Carolina
State Department of Health."
Id. at 503.
54. Id. at 503-04.
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invasion of privacy and the state's rape shield statute."5 The defendant argued

that the public significance exemption precluded finding a common law
invasion of privacy. 6 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's dismissal, holding that the public interest exemption did not apply:
"South Carolina has unequivocally declared the identity of the injured person
shall not be made known in press or broadcast.""7 However, as the court noted
in its opinion, the defendant did not challenge the statute's constitutionality. 8
Twenty-five years later, South Carolina's rape shield statute faced its
first constitutional challenge in Dorman v. Aiken Communications,Inc.5 9 In
Dormana reporter for the Aiken Standardobtained a police report covering the
assault ofareal estate agent by her client." The report did not state the victim's
name or that she had been sexually assaulted. 6 The reporter obtained the
victim's name from other sources and published an article reporting the facts
surrounding the assault, including the victim's name. 62 The victim brought suit
for violation of South Carolina's rape shield statute,63 invasion of privacy, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress." The supreme court, in considering
an appeal from a denied summary judgment motion, declined "to hold the
statute unconstitutional on its face."65 The court affimed the denial of summary

judgment in light of the United States Supreme Court's finding in FloridaStar
that the First Amendment issue concerning rape shield' ' 6statutes should be
addressed "'only as it arose in a discrete factual context.
Im.

POLICY ARGUMENTS SURROUNDING RAPE SHIELD STATUTES

Critics of rape shield statutes assert that publishing victims' names

55. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-81 (Michie 1962) (amended 1976); see also supranote
17 (setting forth 1912 version of the statute).
56. See Nappier,322 F.2d at 505. The district court based its dismissal on the fact that
no "name," as stated in the statute, was actually revealed. See Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life
Ins. Co., 213 F. Supp. 174, 176 (E.D.S.C. 1963). The Fourth Circuit rejected this reasoning.
Nappier,322 F.2d at 504-05.
57. Nappier,322 F.2d at 505.
58. Id.

59. 303 S.C. 63, 398 S.E.2d 687 (1990).
60. Id. at 64-65, 398 S.E.2d at 688.
61. Id. at 65, 398 S.E.2d at 688.
62. Id.
63. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-730 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
64. Dorman, 303 S.C. at 65, 398 S.E.2d at 688.
65. Id. at 66, 398 S.E.2d at 689.
66. Id. at 66, 398 S.E.2d at 688 (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530
(1989)). Although the court did not reach a decision on the First Amendment issue, it did hold
that the legislative history revealed no intent for civil liability to result from violation of the
statute. Id. at 67, 398 S.E.2d at 689. Therefore, the plaintiffs in both Dorman and Berkeley
Publishershad no right to a private cause of action as a result of the violation of the rape shield
statute. However, South Carolina does recognize the common law tort of invasion of privacy.
See Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 336, 95 S.E.2d 606, 609 (1956).
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would eliminate the stigma associated with rape.67 These critics contend that
the anonymity required by such statutes implies that being raped is
disgraceful." In arguing for the publication of rape victim identity, a former
president of the National Organization for Women stated that prohibiting
publication "merely establishes [the victim] as an outcast ....
Pull off the veil
of shame. Print the name. 69 Some victims understand this argument. For
example, after reading an editorial arguing that the stigma of rape could be
eliminated by victims revealing their identities, a rape victim, Nancy
Ziegenmeyer, allowed a newspaper to describe her ordeal. 0
Proponents of rape shield statutes counter these arguments first by
noting that victims should have the option of going public, as did Ziegenmeyer.
After publication of the article, Ziegenmeyer stated: "No one should dictate to
rape victims that they should speak out. It must be their choice."" This view
enjoys wide public support.72 Furthermore, Ziegenmeyer stated: "We're not
going to lessen the stigma by just publishing victims' names."' She also
admitted she would not have reported her rape if she had known her name
would be published by the press.74
Disclosure opponents also argue that victim identification would
reinforce, not reduce, the stigma associated with rape.75 This reinforcement,
they argue, stems from the fact that "the great majority of rapes are committed
by an acquaintance or relative and, therefore, the consent of the victim is often
' As a result, the majority of raped women
presumed."76
who voluntarily disclose
their identities are in steady relationships and raped by strangers.'7
Advocates of disclosure assert that non-disclosure laws do not
encourage the reporting of rape. At least one commentator, noting trends in
both reported and unreported rapes (especially in those states that punish media
disclosure), has "concluded that protecting the identity of victims has not

67. See, e.g., James Warren, Naming Rape Victims a Debatefor Media, CHm. TRIB.,
Apr. 13, 1991, § 1, at 5.
68. See Paul Marcus & Tara L. McMahon, Limiting Disclosure of Rape Victims'
Identities, 64 S. CAL..L. REV. 1019, 1031 (1991).
69. Karen DeCrow, Stop Treating Victims as Pariahs;PrintNames, USA TODAY,
Apr. 4, 1990, at 8A.
70. Marcus & McMahon, supra note 68, at 1032 n.61.
71. Feedback: Other Views on the Crime ofRape, USA TODAY, July 20, 1990, at
13A.
72. See Sandra Sanchez, Rape Poll: No Names, Say 91%, USA TODAY, Apr. 18,
1991, at Al (indicating 91% of adults surveyed felt either that victims, not news organizations,
should decide whether to disclose their identities or that names should never be published).
73. Feedback: Other Views on the Crime ofRape, supra note 71, at 13A.
74. See Rogers Worthington, Rape Victims Caught in Open-Records Clash, Cmn.
TRIB., July 29, 1990, § 1, at 15.
75. See Marcus & McMahon, supra note 68, at 1032-33.
76. Deborah W. Denno, Perspectives on Disclosing Rape Victims' Names, 61
FORDHAML.REv. 1113, 1125 (1993).
77. Marcus & McMahon, supra note 68, at 1033.
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affected... the reporting of crimes. ' 78 However, as Nancy Ziegenmeyer's
comments suggest, rape victims do not necessarily agree with this conclusion.
Furthermore, proponents of disclosure assert that publication of rape victim
identity is an editorial decision not a legislative decision. Members of the press,
such as Michael Gartner, argue that the decision to publish should be made by
editors and news directors, not the legislature or judiciary.8" However, the
public apparently does not support this view. 8'
Both camps vociferously argue the foregoingpolicies as well as others.
This author finds protecting the privacy ofvictims more compelling, especially
in light of the comments from former victims. The First Amendment impact of
prohibiting publication of this one detail surrounding the crime of rape is
minimal, and any adverse impact upon the accused can generally be eliminated
while still maintaining the anonymity of the victim to the general public.
IV.

RAPE
CAROLINA'S
SOUTH
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD

SHIELD

STATUTE

AND

THE

The Daily Mail Court established, and the Florida Star Court
reaffirmed, the constitutional standard by which rape shield statutes are
measured: "[I]f [the media] lawfully obtains truthful information about a
matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the
highest order."8" A discussion of the individual components of this standard
follows.
A.

Lawfully Obtains

In Cox Broadcastingthe Court held that a newspaper could not be held
liable for publishing a rape victim's name taken from a publicly available
judicial record.83 The Daily Mail Court, by using the language "lawfully
obtains," expanded the scope of acceptable acquisition by the media to include
"routine newspaper reporting techniques."" Although the Daily Mail Court
expressly limited its holding, the "lawfully obtains" language is clearly
broad-any investigative technique, no matter how intrusive or annoying, falls
within it, as long as no statute is broken in the process.

78. Carey Haughwout, ProhibitingRape Victim Identification in the Media: Is It
Constitutional?,23 U. TOL. L. REv. 735, 749 (1992).
79. See supra notes 71, 73-74 and accompanying text.
80. See Michael Gartner, Naming Rape Victims: Usually, There Are GoodReasons
to Do It, USA TODAY, Apr. 22, 1991, at 6A.
81. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
82. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979); accordFlorida Star v.
B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).
83. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,496-97 (1975).
84. DailyMail, 443 U.S. at 103.
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Public Significance

The commission of a crime and the judicial proceedings surrounding
the crime are matters ofpublic significance.85 The media therefore have a right,
and a duty, to report the information they legally obtain.86 In FloridaStar the
Court affirmed this principle, specifically regarding a rape victim's name, by
stating that "the article generally, as opposed to the specific identity contained
within it, involved a matter of paramount public import: the commission, and
investigation, of a violent crime ....
The applicability of this portion of the
Daily Mail standard to information surrounding a rape, including the victim's
identity, is generally not questioned.
C.

State Interest

In the "state interest" portion of the Daily Mail standard, legislative
drafting has an impact. A constitutionally defensible rape shield statute must
be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. To date, the United
States Supreme Court has not found a rape shield statute to meet this rigorous
standard. However, one can gain some insight from the state interests that have
been asserted unsuccessfully.
In Cox BroadcastingGeorgia defended its statute as protecting the
"zone of privacy surrounding every individual."88 The Court ruled this interest
is inadequate to prohibit publication when the identity of the victim appears in
public records.89 In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court' the Court struck
down a Massachusetts law mandating closure of trials involving sexual assaults
on minors.9 ' The Court held that the state interests asserted, protecting the
identity of victims and encouraging victims to testify, were insufficient.92 In
FloridaStar the state asserted victim privacy, victim safety, and encouraging
the reporting of sexual assaults as compelling state interests.93 Although
recognizing these interests as "highly significant," the Court nonetheless
concluded they were inadequate because the statute was not narrowly tailored
to accomplish them.9" The Court outlined three considerations leading to its
conclusion: the source of the prohibited information, the overbreadth of the

85. See Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 492.

86. See id.
87. FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 536-37.
88. Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 487.
89. See id. at 494-95 ("[I]nterests in privacy fade when the information involved
already appears on the public record.").
90. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
91. See id. at610-11.
92. Id.at 607-10.
93. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 537 (1989).
94. Id. at 541.
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statute, and the underinclusiveness of the statute. 95 Application of these three
factors to South Carolina's rape shield statute reveals obvious constitutional
defects. Nonetheless, the South Carolina General Assembly has neglected to
amend the state's statute.
1.

PublicInformation

The FloridaStar Court first considered the newspaper's source ofthe
victim's name, specifically the state's own police report-a document available
to the general public. 96 The Court said that as custodian of sensitive
information, the government should find "less drastic means than punishing
truthful publication" to prevent the information's release.97 The Court
recommended other means to prevent the release, such as classifying
information, redacting releases, and providing damage remedies against the
government for the release. 9 Information obtained through non-public sources
could be untangled, in some cases, from the stringent Daily Mail criteria by
prohibiting its "nonconsensual acquisition." 99

The United States Supreme Court stated in Florida Star and Cox
Broadcastingthat a state cannot punish the media for publishing truthful
information already in the public domain. As currently drafted, South
Carolina's rape shield statute does not incorporate this directive. A
constitutional rape shield statute would except information already inthe public
domain. To ensure the confidentiality of rape victims, the legislature should
develop and vigorously apply additional state procedures. These procedures
should ultimately (1) prevent sensitive identity information held by the
government from falling into the public domain and (2) prohibit the
nonconsensual release of such information in the hands of private individuals.
This latter goal introduces additional complications the legislature should
address.
2.

Overbroad

As written, South Carolina's rape privacy statute makes unlawful any
publication of the name of a sexual assault victim, regardless of the
circumstances. Under this broad standard, publishing a consensual interview
with a sexual assault victim, as happened in both the Mike Tyson and William
Kennedy Smith cases, could result in prosecution." ° The FloridaStar Court
95. Id. at 537-40.
96. Id. at 536.
97. Id. at 534.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. People published an interview with the victim in the Mike Tyson case, and
Vanity Fairpublished an interview with the alleged victim in the William Kennedy Smith trial.
See Carey Haughwout, supra note 81, at 743 & nn.67-68.
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also addressed this point and emphasized that the flexibility of a case-by-case
analysis is necessary when restricting rights as fundamental as freedom of
speech or of the press.'' The South Carolina legislature should amend the rape
shield statute to remove this broad standard and replace it with one that allows
for a case-by-case determination of the appropriateness of publishing a sexual
assault victim's identity.
3.

Underinclusive

Statutes that place restrictions only on the media are constitutionally
suspect.' °2 South Carolina's rape shield statute penalizes publication "in any
newspaper, magazine or other publication."' 0 3 In FloridaStar the Court ruled
that a similar prohibition restricting publication by an instrument of mass
communication was unconstitutionally underinclusive because it did not
prohibit less widespread disclosures:
When a State attempts the extraordinary
measure ofpunishing truthful publication in
the name of privacy, it must demonstrate its
commitment to advancing this interest by
applying its prohibition evenhandedly, to
the smalltime disseminator as well as the
media giant. Where important First
Amendment interests are at stake, the mass
scope of disclosure is not an acceptable
surrogate for injury. A ban on disclosures
effected by "instrument[s] of mass
communication" simply cannot be defended
on the ground that partial prohibitions may
effect partial relief. Without more careful
and inclusive precautions against alternative
fonns of dissemination, we cannot conclude
that Florida's selective ban on publication

101. See FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 530 ("[W]e have emphasized each time that we
were resolving this conflict only as it arose in a discrete factual context."); see also WXYZ, Inc.
v. Hand, 463 F. Supp. 1070, 1072 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (striking down a Michigan statute requiring
the granting of a protective order in sexual assault trials upon the request of either party because
the statute allowed no discretion on the part of the court).
102. See Minneapolis Star &Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r ofRevenue, 460 U.S.
575, 585 (1983) ("[D]ifferential treatment, unless justified by some special characteristic of the
press, suggests that the goal of the regulation is not unrelated to suppression of expression, and
such a goal is presumptively unconstitutional.").
103. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-730 (Law. Co-op. 1976). In Dorman v. Aiken
Communications,Inc., 303 S.C. 63, 66,398 S.E.2d 687,688 (1990), the South Carolina Supreme
Court ruled that this language is broad enough to cover publication by electronic media as well.
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by the mass media satisfactorily
accomplishes its stated purpose.1 °
However, ample precedent exists for upholding the constitutionality
of statutes that apply to all generally and that do not single out the press, even

though these statutes affect the press's ability to report the news.' °5 South
Carolina's rape shield statute should be amended to restrict publication by
anyone to avoid underinclusiveness.
V.

CONCLUSION

In FloridaStar the United States Supreme Court explicitly left open
the possibility of a constitutional rape shield statute." 6 Although the Court was
not thorough in its explanation, it did provide some guidance on how to draft
such a statute. The legislature, and presumably the citizens, of South Carolina
clearly find this statute worthwhile. With revision, its ability to survive
constitutional attack could be greatly improved.
Kevin O'Brien

104. FloridaStar,491 U.S. at 540-41 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
105. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-71 (1991) (rejecting the
newspaper's argument that application of a general state promissory estoppel statute infringed
the newspaper's First Amendment rights); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562,
578 (1977) (explaining that the press must obey general copyright laws).
106. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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